Federal Bill Analysis: H.R. 5068 - MORE Act (2025)
The Well-Intentioned Path to Market Destruction
Primary Sponsor: Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY)
Status: Introduced August 29, 2025 | Referred to House Judiciary Committee
Official Title: "Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act"
Congress.gov: H.R. 5068
Executive Summary
The MORE Act represents the most ambitious cannabis reform proposal ever introduced in Congress. It would completely deschedule cannabis from the Controlled Substances Act, expunge federal cannabis convictions, establish social equity reinvestment programs, and open SBA access to cannabis businesses.
On paper, this is everything reformers have demanded for decades.
In practice, this bill would devastate the very industry and communities it claims to help.
This analysis applies the CBDT Framework to expose how the MORE Act's structural failures would trigger interstate commerce chaos, regulatory race-to-the-bottom dynamics, and the destruction of compliant state-licensed operators who invested billions building legal markets under the current framework.
CBDT Assessment: The MORE Act fails on 4 of 5 policy levers and introduces catastrophic market fragmentation that the Framework predicts would collapse legal market share in mature states while providing minimal gains in prohibition states.
What the MORE Act Does
The 91-page legislation includes:
- Complete Descheduling — Removes cannabis and THC from the Controlled Substances Act entirely (not rescheduling to III, but full removal)
- Federal Expungement — Mandates automatic review and expungement of non-violent federal cannabis convictions dating to May 1, 1971
- Opportunity Trust Fund — Creates a federal cannabis tax (5% initially, rising to 8% by year five) with revenue split:
- 60% to Community Reinvestment Grants (job training, legal aid, substance treatment)
- 40% to SBA programs for disadvantaged cannabis entrepreneurs
- SBA Access — Requires Small Business Administration to treat cannabis businesses like any other eligible business
- State Autonomy — Does not require states to legalize; maintains state regulatory discretion
- Immigration Protection — Prevents cannabis use from being grounds for immigration consequences
The CBDT Framework Analysis
The Consumer-Driven Black Market Displacement Framework evaluates cannabis policy through five scaled levers that predict legal market adoption:
ΔU = 4(−g) + D + 1.2S + F + 0.6E − 0.8 × F_frag
Where:
- g = Price gap (legal vs. black market)
- D = Density (retail access points)
- S = Safety/quality (testing, regulation)
- F = Convenience (purchase friction)
- E = Enforcement (against illicit market)
- F_frag = Market fragmentation modifier
The MORE Act's impact on each lever:
Lever 1: Price Gap (g) — CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
Weight: 4× (highest impact)
The MORE Act enables immediate interstate commerce upon descheduling. Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, states cannot discriminate against products from other states once cannabis is federally legal.
What happens:
California's Emerald Triangle, Oregon's outdoor grows, and other low-cost production regions can ship directly to high-cost markets like Massachusetts, Illinois, and New Jersey.
Current wholesale prices:
- Oregon outdoor: $200-400/lb
- California outdoor: $300-600/lb
- Massachusetts indoor: $2,000-3,000/lb
- Illinois indoor: $2,500-4,000/lb
Result: Vertically integrated MSOs that invested $50-100M building cultivation facilities in every state they operate suddenly compete against $300/lb outdoor cannabis from California.
The price gap lever doesn't just improve—it inverts. Legal cannabis from low-cost states undercuts local operators, but those local operators can't compete on cost because they built facilities to comply with state regulations requiring in-state production.
CBDT Prediction: States with high-cost indoor cultivation (Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York) see 40-60% of licensed operators fail within 24 months as Oregon/California product floods markets.
Lever 2: Access Density (D) — NEUTRAL TO NEGATIVE
Weight: 1×
The MORE Act does not require states to legalize. Texas, Idaho, Kansas, and other prohibition states can maintain their bans.
What happens:
- 24 legal states: Density unchanged (already have retail networks)
- 26 prohibition states: Density remains zero
But here's the CBDT problem: Interstate commerce enables legal California cannabis to flow through prohibition states en route to legal markets. This creates enforcement chaos and reduces any state's incentive to build a regulated market.
Why would Texas legalize if Texans can drive to New Mexico, buy California-grown cannabis, and return home? The "containment" incentive that pushed states toward legalization (keep cannabis dollars in-state) disappears.
CBDT Prediction: States currently considering legalization (e.g., Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania pre-2024) delay or abandon programs. Why build expensive regulatory infrastructure when interstate commerce provides access anyway?
Lever 3: Safety/Quality (S) — CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
Weight: 1.2×
This is where your instinct is exactly right.
Current state systems require:
- Seed-to-sale tracking (Metrc, BioTrack)
- Pesticide testing (state-specific limits)
- Heavy metal testing
- Potency verification
- Microbial contamination testing
- Residual solvent testing
- Child-resistant packaging
- Lab certification and auditing
The MORE Act provides:
- One FDA public meeting within one year to "address the regulation, safety, manufacturing, product quality, marketing, labeling, and sale of products containing cannabis"
That's it. One meeting. No testing standards. No packaging requirements. No potency limits. No seed-to-sale tracking.
What happens:
The FDA—which took 7 years to issue guidance on CBD and still hasn't finalized it—is supposed to create a comprehensive cannabis regulatory framework while states with established testing regimes watch their compliant operators compete against untested, untracked product from states with no standards.
The Race to the Bottom:
Oregon requires testing at state-licensed labs with ISO 17025 certification. But if Oklahoma (which has 7,000+ licenses and minimal testing enforcement) can ship to Oregon, what's the point of Oregon's standards?
Licensed operators in strict states face a choice:
- Maintain compliance costs ($50-100K annually for testing alone)
- Watch untested product undercut them on price
- Lobby their state to weaken standards (race to bottom)
- Go out of business
CBDT Prediction: States abandon independent testing regimes within 18-36 months. Consumer safety improvements from a decade of state-level regulation are reversed.
Lever 4: Convenience (F) — MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT
Weight: 1×
SBA access and banking normalization do improve convenience for operators, reducing cash-handling costs and enabling normal business operations.
But consumer convenience is unchanged—retail access depends on state law, and prohibition states aren't required to permit sales.
CBDT Assessment: Modest positive for operators in legal states, zero impact in prohibition states.
Lever 5: Enforcement (E) — COMPLETE COLLAPSE
Weight: 0.6×
Here's the enforcement paradox:
Under current law: State-legal cannabis must be grown, tested, and sold within state borders. Interstate transport is federal trafficking. This creates clear enforcement lines—product crossing borders is definitionally illegal.
Under the MORE Act: Cannabis can move freely between legal states. But prohibition states can't inspect shipments for "trafficking" because the product is federally legal. They can only enforce possession at the final destination.
What happens:
California's estimated 9 million pounds of annual unlicensed cannabis production—currently "trafficking" if it crosses borders—becomes legally transportable. Licensed California operators can ship legally. Unlicensed operators can... also ship. How do you tell the difference?
Current seed-to-sale tracking exists within states. There is no federal tracking system. The MORE Act doesn't create one.
Result: The "gray market" (unlicensed but tolerated) and true black market gain legal cover for interstate transport. Prohibition states see increased inflow with reduced enforcement tools. Legal states see market share diluted by untracked product claiming origin in low-enforcement jurisdictions.
CBDT Prediction: Enforcement lever collapses to near-zero. Black market share increases 10-20% nationally, concentrated in former high-enforcement states.
The Fragmentation Modifier (F_frag) — MAXIMUM PENALTY
Weight: −0.8×
The CBDT Framework includes a fragmentation modifier that penalizes incoherent policy structures:
Current fragmentation (state-by-state): Already imposes penalties, but each state's market is internally coherent.
MORE Act fragmentation: Creates a new category—federally legal cannabis with 50+ incompatible state regulatory regimes, no federal testing standards, no interstate tracking, and immediate commerce between states with radically different quality controls.
This is maximum F_frag. The modifier applies its full penalty.
The Political Reality: Dead on Arrival
Beyond CBDT failures, the MORE Act faces insurmountable political obstacles:
Republican Control of House Judiciary Committee
Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH) chairs the Judiciary Committee. He voted against the MORE Act in 2020 and 2022. The bill will not receive a hearing.
39 Sponsors, All Democrats
Zero Republican cosponsors. In a Republican-controlled House, this is a messaging bill, not serious legislation.
Conservative State Opposition
26 states maintain cannabis prohibition. Their congressional delegations will not vote to enable interstate commerce that floods their states with legal cannabis from California.
Previous Failures
The MORE Act passed the House twice (2020, 2022) when Democrats controlled the chamber. It never received a Senate vote. With Republicans controlling the House in the 119th Congress, it won't reach the floor.
Who Actually Benefits from the MORE Act
The bill's beneficiaries aren't who you'd expect:
Winners:
| Beneficiary | How They Win |
|---|---|
| Low-cost outdoor cultivators (OR, CA) | Can ship nationwide, crushing high-cost competitors |
| Large MSOs with California/Oregon footprint | Consolidate market share as competitors fail |
| Gray market operators | Interstate transport legalized, no tracking required |
| Prohibition state consumers | Access via interstate commerce without state legalization |
Losers:
| Victim | How They Lose |
|---|---|
| Single-state operators | Can't compete with $300/lb California outdoor |
| States that invested in testing regimes | Compliance costs become competitive disadvantage |
| Social equity licensees | First to fail when prices collapse (least capitalized) |
| Consumers in legal states | Testing standards erode, product safety declines |
| State tax revenue | Race to bottom on taxes to match low-cost states |
What the MORE Act Gets Right
Credit where due:
- Expungement provisions are comprehensive and automatic
- Immigration protections address real harm to non-citizens
- SBA access would normalize business operations
- Social equity intent is genuine, even if implementation fails
- 280E elimination (implicit in descheduling) removes punitive taxation
These provisions belong in federal reform. But bundled with immediate interstate commerce and no federal regulatory framework, they're poison pills attached to a toxic core.
The CBDT-Optimal Alternative
What would the CBDT Framework recommend instead?
Phase 1: Remove 280E + SAFE Banking (0-12 months)
- Eliminates price gap penalty from punitive taxation
- Enables normal banking operations
- Requires no new federal regulatory infrastructure
- Preserves state regulatory autonomy
Phase 2: Schedule III Rescheduling (12-24 months)
- Acknowledges medical use
- Enables research
- Maintains DEA enforcement against interstate trafficking
- States retain ability to set stricter standards
Phase 3: FDA Framework Development (24-48 months)
- FDA develops testing standards through rulemaking
- States can adopt, modify, or exceed federal baseline
- Seed-to-sale tracking framework established
Phase 4: Conditional Interstate Commerce (48-60 months)
- Permitted only between states meeting federal testing minimums
- Tracking system operational
- States can opt out of interstate commerce if desired
- Gradual transition protects existing operators
This sequencing respects the CBDT principle that policy coherence matters more than policy ambition. The MORE Act maximizes ambition while destroying coherence.
Conclusion: Good Intentions, Catastrophic Design
The MORE Act embodies everything progressives have demanded from cannabis reform. It's also a blueprint for industry destruction.
CBDT Framework Score:
| Lever | Impact | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Price Gap (g) | ↓↓↓ | Interstate commerce inverts competitive advantage |
| Density (D) | → | No change for consumers |
| Safety (S) | ↓↓↓ | Testing standards collapse without federal floor |
| Convenience (F) | ↑ | Modest improvement for operators |
| Enforcement (E) | ↓↓ | Interstate transport defeats enforcement |
| Fragmentation (F_frag) | ↓↓↓ | Maximum penalty applied |
Predicted Outcome: If enacted, the MORE Act would trigger a 24-48 month consolidation crisis. 50-70% of licensed operators in high-cost states fail. Testing standards erode nationally. Black market share increases in former strict-enforcement states. Social equity programs collapse as their licensees—typically undercapitalized—are first to fail.
The communities the MORE Act claims to help would be devastated.
Bottom Line: This bill is dead on arrival politically, and that's probably merciful. Its passage would prove that good intentions without good design produce bad outcomes.
The cannabis industry doesn't need a revolution. It needs targeted repairs to an imperfect but functional state-based system. The MORE Act offers revolution when repair is required.
CBDT Framework Citation
This analysis applies the Consumer-Driven Black Market Displacement Framework:
Silent Majority 420, "Consumer-Driven Black Market Displacement (CBDT) Framework: A Behavioral-Utility Heuristic for Illicit-to-Legal Market Transition," Zenodo, 2025. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17593077
Validation data available via Harvard Dataverse: 10.7910/DVN/MDVDTQ
Analysis by The Silent Majority 420 | Track this bill at tracker.silentmajority420.com