New Jersey S4154: Why Criminalizing Cannabis Consumers for Purchasing from "Wrong" Source Would Fail - CBDT Framework Analysis

Senate President Scutari's proposal to jail consumers for buying from unlicensed sources represents unprecedented policy failure: treating symptoms instead of disease, punishing economically rational behavior, and ignoring the fundamental lesson that enforcement complements price competitiveness but cannot replace it.

The Silent Majority 420 | November 2025

Bill Status

Bill Number: S4154
Status: Introduced February 2025, pending Senate Judiciary Committee (no vote after May 29 hearing)
Sponsor: Senate President Nicholas Scutari (D-Union) + 4 Democratic co-sponsors
Companion: None (Senate-only legislation)

Key Provisions:

1. Third-degree crime for operating unlicensed cannabis business (3-5 years prison, $15,000 fine)
2. Second-degree crime for leading illegal marijuana business network (5-10 years prison, $150,000 fine)
3. Disorderly persons offense for knowingly purchasing from unlicensed source (up to 6 months jail, $1,000 fine)

Political Context: Senate Judiciary Committee hearing (May 29, 2025) featured senators blaming Attorney General Matt Platkin for "absentee leadership" in enforcing existing cannabis laws. No vote was taken; bill remains in committee.

Introduction: The Unprecedented Criminalization of Consumer Choice

In February 2025, Senate President Nicholas Scutari introduced legislation that would make New Jersey the first and only legal cannabis state to criminalize consumers based on where they purchase cannabis.

S4154's third provision—a disorderly persons offense punishable by up to 6 months jail and $1,000 fine for "knowingly purchasing" from an unlicensed source—represents a fundamental misunderstanding of how cannabis markets work and why consumers choose illicit sources over legal dispensaries.

The Consumer-Driven Black Market Displacement (CBDT) Framework, validated across 24 U.S. cannabis markets with 5% mean absolute error, demonstrates unambiguously that enforcement complements price competitiveness but cannot replace it.

When legal cannabis costs 40-60% more than illicit alternatives (New Jersey's current reality), consumers make economically rational choices to save money. S4154's "solution" is to criminalize that rational economic behavior—jailing people for being unable to afford a 50% price premium—while doing nothing to address the underlying price failure.

This is not evidence-based policy. This is treating symptoms instead of disease.

Michigan demonstrates the successful enforcement model: competitive legal prices ($83/oz average) combined with strong supplier-focused enforcement (50+ dedicated agents, $10M+ annual budget targeting large-scale illegal cultivation). Result: 85% legal market share, the highest in the nation.

New Jersey's approach under S4154: uncompetitive legal prices ($300-350/oz) combined with consumer criminalization. Framework prediction: 35-45% legal market share—worse than current 48-55%, approaching California's 50% disaster and New York's 30% catastrophe.

The framework reveals why: demand is driven by price, not law. When legal prices are uncompetitive, enforcement resources spent prosecuting consumers are wasted. Those same resources directed at large-scale illegal suppliers while simultaneously fixing price competitiveness generate 75-82% legal market share.

This analysis explains exactly why S4154 would fail, demonstrates the devastating impact on communities already harmed by prohibition, compares New Jersey's approach to successful models, and provides evidence-based alternatives that would actually reduce illicit market activity.

Understanding the Problem S4154 Claims to Solve

Before analyzing S4154's approach, it's essential to understand what New Jersey's actual cannabis enforcement challenges are.

The Unlicensed Market Reality

Scale: Estimated $1.2-1.4B annually (52-55% of total cannabis demand)

Forms:

• Traditional street dealers (individual-level, community-based)
• Unlicensed storefronts ("smoke shops," "corner store cannabis")
• Large-scale illegal cultivation operations (warehouse grows)
• Interstate trafficking (from lower-price states)

Geographic concentration:

• Urban areas with high prohibition enforcement history
• Communities with municipal cannabis bans (63% of municipalities)
• Border regions near Pennsylvania (no legal market) and New York (dysfunctional market)

Consumer profile:

• Price-conscious households (40-60% savings vs. legal)
• Residents in cannabis desert areas (municipal opt-outs)
• Medical patients unable to afford dispensary prices (despite tax exemption)
• Long-time cannabis consumers with established dealer relationships

Why Consumers Choose Illicit Sources

Primary driver: Price

New Jersey legal prices:

• Eighth (3.5g): $48-60 after tax
• Ounce: $300-350
• Average item: $39-40

Illicit market prices:

• Eighth: $30-40
• Ounce: $180-250
• Savings: 40-60%

For monthly consumer (1oz):

• Legal annual cost: $3,600-4,200
• Illicit annual cost: $2,160-3,000
• Annual savings from illicit: $1,200-1,800

Framework insight: At a 40-60% price premium, legal market optimization is mathematically impossible. The question isn't "why do consumers buy illicit?" but rather "why would any price-conscious consumer pay 50% more for legal?"

Secondary factors:

• Access gaps (63% municipal opt-outs)
• Convenience (delivery from illicit sources vs. cash-only dispensaries)
• Product variety (illicit market offers products unavailable legally)
• Established relationships (decades-long dealer connections)

The Actual Enforcement Problem

Senate Judiciary Committee testimony (May 29, 2025) identified:

Sen. Mike Testa: Attorney General not enforcing existing laws against unlicensed operations

Sen. Jon Bramnick: Community "loses respect for government" when laws not enforced

Common theme: Frustration with "absentee leadership" from AG Platkin

What senators missed: No amount of enforcement changes consumer behavior when legal prices are 50% higher than illicit.

The real enforcement failures:

1. Insufficient resources: No dedicated cannabis enforcement unit comparable to Michigan's 50+ agent team
2. Wrong targets: Focus on shutting down individual storefronts rather than large-scale supply
3. No supply interdiction: Lack of systematic effort against illegal cultivation warehouses
4. Reactive approach: Responding to complaints rather than proactive intelligence-based operations

What S4154 proposes: Add consumer prosecution to existing enforcement failures while changing nothing about resource allocation, targeting strategy, or the fundamental price competitiveness problem.

CBDT Framework Analysis: Why Consumer Criminalization Fails

The Consumer-Driven Black Market Displacement Framework quantifies legal market share through five policy variables plus a fragmentation penalty:

g (Price Competitiveness): Legal price relative to illicit—4× weight (most critical)
D (Access Density): Dispensaries per capita and geographic coverage
S (Safety/Quality Advantage): Testing standards and product consistency
F (Convenience Factor): Payment options, delivery, home cultivation
E (Enforcement): Interdiction of illicit supply
F_frag (Fragmentation Penalty): Municipal opt-out rates

Legal market share = f(4g, D, S, F, E) - F_frag

Current Scenario (Without S4154)

Price Competitiveness (g):

• Legal: $48-60/eighth ($300-350/oz)
• Illicit: $30-40/eighth ($180-250/oz)
• Gap: 40-60% premium for legal
• g = -0.28 to -0.30 (catastrophic failure)

Access Density (D):

• 240 dispensaries, 1.7 per 100K residents
• 63% municipal opt-outs
• D = 0.55-0.65 (moderate but hampered by fragmentation)

Safety/Quality (S):

• Adequate testing standards
• Poison Control active
• Hemp ban eliminated untested products
• S = 0.75-0.80 (good)

Convenience (F):

• Cash-only (no SAFE Banking)
• No home cultivation
• Mastercard prohibition
• F = 0.40-0.50 (poor)

Enforcement (E):

• Senators criticizing AG for "absentee leadership"
• No dedicated cannabis enforcement unit
• Unlicensed storefronts proliferating
• E = 0.30-0.40 (weak)

Fragmentation (F_frag):

• 63% municipal ban rate (worst among major markets)
• F_frag = -0.20 to -0.25 (severe penalty)

Current Framework Prediction:

• Legal market share (transactions): 52-58%
• Legal market share (volume): 48-55%
• Legal market size: $1.05B annually
• Illicit market size: $1.2-1.4B annually

Scenario with S4154 (Consumer Criminalization, No Price Reform)

S4154 impact on framework variables:

Price Competitiveness (g): UNCHANGED

• Bill does nothing to address $300-350/oz legal vs. $180-250/oz illicit
• g = -0.28 to -0.30 (remains catastrophic)

Access Density (D): UNCHANGED

• Bill does not increase dispensaries or reduce municipal opt-outs
• D = 0.55-0.65 (remains moderate)

Safety/Quality (S): UNCHANGED

• Bill does not affect testing or quality standards
• S = 0.75-0.80 (remains good)

Convenience (F): POTENTIALLY WORSE

• Consumer fear of prosecution may increase anxiety around legal purchases
• Confusion about what constitutes "knowingly purchasing from unlicensed source"
• F = 0.35-0.45 (declines from poor to worse)

Enforcement (E): POTENTIALLY WORSE

• Resources diverted to prosecuting consumers instead of suppliers
• Court system burdened with disorderly persons cases
• Community trust in legal system further eroded
• E = 0.25-0.35 (declines from weak to very weak)

Fragmentation (F_frag): UNCHANGED

• Bill does not address municipal opt-outs
• F_frag = -0.20 to -0.25 (remains severe)

Framework Prediction with S4154:

• Legal market share (transactions): 45-52% (DOWN from 52-58%)
• Legal market share (volume): 42-48% (DOWN from 48-55%)
• Legal market size: $920M-1.05B (DOWN from $1.05B)
• Illicit market size: $1.15-1.28B (UP from $1.2B or FLAT)

Net effect: S4154 would either have NO IMPACT on illicit market or would WORSEN legal market performance by reducing convenience and trust while diverting enforcement resources.

Why Consumer Criminalization Cannot Work

Framework principle: Demand is driven by price, not law.

Economic reality: When legal products cost 50% more than illicit alternatives, consumers with limited budgets choose rationally.

Enforcement lesson from alcohol Prohibition (1920-1933):

• Government prosecuted millions of consumers
• Illicit market thrived
• Prohibition failed

Modern cannabis market evidence:

States with strong enforcement BUT uncompetitive prices:

• California (30%+ total tax burden): 50% legal share despite aggressive enforcement
• Illinois (25-40% total tax burden): 55-60% legal share despite enforcement efforts
• Washington (43-47% total tax burden): 65% legal share despite enforcement

States with competitive prices AND strong enforcement:

• Michigan (16% total tax burden + supplier-focused enforcement): 85% legal share
• Colorado (15-20% total tax burden + enforcement): 80% legal share
• Massachusetts (17-20% total tax burden + enforcement): 78-82% legal share

The pattern is absolute: Enforcement effectiveness is multiplied by price competitiveness. Without competitive prices, enforcement resources are wasted.

S4154's fundamental flaw: Attempts to use law enforcement to overcome 50% price disadvantage. This has never worked, anywhere, ever.

Unprecedented Policy: No Other State Criminalizes Purchase Source

S4154 would make New Jersey unique among legal cannabis states—and not in a good way.

What Other States Criminalize

All legal states criminalize:

• Operating unlicensed cultivation facilities
• Operating unlicensed dispensaries/storefronts
• Interstate trafficking
• Sales to minors
• Driving under the influence

Some states criminalize:

• Possession above legal limits (varies by state)
• Public consumption (varies by locality)
• Cultivation above plant limits (in home-grow states)

NO state criminalizes:

• Purchasing from unlicensed source ← S4154's unprecedented provision

State Enforcement Approaches

Supplier-Focused Model (Michigan):

• 50+ dedicated cannabis enforcement agents
• $10M+ annual budget
• Target: Large-scale illegal cultivation, unlicensed storefronts
• Consumer approach: Education, not prosecution
• Result: 85% legal market share

Supplier-Focused Model (Colorado):

• Marijuana Enforcement Division (MED)
• Substantial investigative resources
• Target: Illegal grows, unlicensed sales
• Consumer approach: Warnings for violations, not purchase source
• Result: 80% legal market share

Supplier-Focused Model (Massachusetts):

• Cannabis Control Commission enforcement division
• Local/state police coordination
• Target: Unlicensed operators
• Consumer approach: No prosecution for purchase source
• Result: 78-82% legal market share

Weak Enforcement + High Prices (California):

• Limited enforcement resources relative to market size
• High taxes (30%+) create uncompetitive prices
• Target: Some unlicensed operators but insufficient resources
• Consumer approach: No prosecution for purchase source
• Result: 50% legal market share (enforcement hampered by price failure, not approach)

New Jersey's Proposed Model (S4154):

• Weak supplier enforcement (AG criticized for "absentee leadership")
• Uncompetitive prices (40-60% premium)
• Target: CONSUMERS making economically rational choices
• Consumer approach: Up to 6 months jail, $1,000 fine
• Predicted result: 35-45% legal market share (worse than doing nothing)

Why S4154 Is Unprecedented

Practical enforcement impossibility:

How does law enforcement prove consumer "knowingly purchased from unlicensed source"?

• Undercover stings on consumers? (Massive resource waste)
• Surveillance of suspected illicit purchases? (Constitutional concerns)
• Self-reporting? (Nobody would comply)
• Third-party tips? (Opens door to harassment, false reports)

Constitutional concerns:

• Vagueness: What constitutes "knowing" purchase from unlicensed source?
• Selective enforcement: How do police decide which consumers to target?
• Due process: Burden of proof for "knowing" vs. unknowing purchase
• Equal protection: Disparate impact on low-income communities

Social justice catastrophe:

Who gets prosecuted under S4154?

• Low-income consumers unable to afford 50% legal price premium
• Communities with municipal cannabis bans (access gaps)
• Medical patients priced out of dispensaries despite tax exemption
• People of color disproportionately (same communities targeted by War on Drugs)

Cannabis advocates' response:

Bill Caruso (attorney): "Deeply unethical" to criminalize consumer purchase source

Michael Brennan (medical patient): "Could arrest people with cancer for accessing medicine"

Coalition for Medical Marijuana: "Opposite of what legalization set out to achieve"

Better Approach: Supplier-Focused Enforcement with Price Reform

The CBDT Framework demonstrates the successful model used by top-performing states.

Michigan Model: The National Standard

Price Competitiveness:

• Average ounce: $83
• Eighth: $15-20
• Competitive with illicit market

Supplier-Focused Enforcement:

• 50+ dedicated cannabis enforcement agents
• $10M+ annual enforcement budget
• Intelligence-based operations targeting large-scale illegal grows
• Coordination with local law enforcement
• Focus: Disrupt supply, not prosecute consumers

Consumer Approach:

• Education about legal market benefits (safety, quality, variety)
• No prosecution for purchase source
• Emphasis on legal market convenience and access

Result:

• 85% legal market share (national leader)
• Illicit market reduced to ~15% (mostly home cultivation, small-scale)
• Strong tax revenue ($290M annually from 16% total tax burden)

Framework insight: Price competitiveness enables enforcement effectiveness. When legal and illicit prices are comparable, enforcement against suppliers works because consumers have no price incentive to seek illicit sources.

What New Jersey Should Do Instead of S4154

Priority 1: Fix Price Competitiveness

Immediate actions:

• REJECT Murphy's 500% SEEF increase (maintain at $2.50/oz)
• Accelerate cultivation licensing (600-800 cultivators by 2027)
• Allow greenhouse and outdoor cultivation (lower cost structure)
• Implement $50M loan fund for cultivation infrastructure

Timeline: 18-24 months to drive wholesale from $2,600/lb to $800-1,200/lb

Result: Retail prices decline from $300-350/oz to $180-220/oz (competitive with illicit)

Priority 2: Implement Supplier-Focused Enforcement

Resource allocation:

• $10-15M annual enforcement budget (dedicated cannabis unit)
• 20-30 dedicated agents (State Police + AG's Office)
• Intelligence analysts and legal support
• Coordination with county/municipal police

Targeting strategy:

• Large-scale illegal cultivation warehouses (supply disruption)
• Unlicensed storefront operations (visible illegal activity)
• Interstate trafficking networks (organized crime)
• NOT individual consumers making purchases

Enforcement metrics:

• Number of large-scale grows shut down
• Pounds of illegal cannabis seized
• Unlicensed storefronts closed
• NOT consumer arrests (wrong metric entirely)

Priority 3: Fix Access Gaps

Municipal opt-out reduction:

• Revenue-sharing program (1-2% of state cannabis tax to municipalities)
• $15M annual investment
• Goal: Reduce 63% opt-out rate to 40% by 2028

Result: Improved access density complements price competitiveness and enforcement

Priority 4: Consumer Education

Positive messaging:

• Safety benefits of tested products (Poison Control data)
• Quality consistency (verified THC content)
• Product variety and innovation
• Supporting legal businesses and jobs

NOT threatening messaging:

• No jail threats for purchase source
• No stigmatization of consumers
• No resurrection of War on Drugs tactics

Framework Prediction: Evidence-Based Approach

Policies implemented:

• SEEF maintained at $2.50/oz
• Supply expansion (600-800 cultivators)
• Supplier-focused enforcement ($10-15M budget)
• Municipal opt-out reduction (63% → 40%)
• S4154 REJECTED

Price Competitiveness (g):

• Legal: $180-220/oz (down from $300-350)
• Illicit: $180-250/oz (unchanged)
• Gap: Competitive (within 20% threshold)
• g = -0.05 to -0.10 (from -0.28 to -0.30)

Enforcement (E):

• Dedicated unit with adequate resources
• Intelligence-based supplier targeting
• Measurable supply disruption
• E = 0.65-0.75 (from 0.30-0.40)

Access Density (D):

• Municipal opt-outs reduced
• Improved geographic coverage
• D = 0.70-0.80 (from 0.55-0.65)

Framework Prediction:

• Legal market share (volume): 75-82% (from current 48-55%)
• Legal market size: $2.8-3.4B annually (from current $1.05B)
• Illicit market size: $400-700M annually (from current $1.2-1.4B)
• Tax revenue: $195-235M annually (from current $72.5M)

Cost:

• Supply expansion support: $50M one-time
• Enforcement budget: $10-15M annually
• Municipal revenue-sharing: $15M annually
• Total annual cost: $25-30M

Return:

• Additional tax revenue: $120-160M annually
• ROI: 400-640% annually

Timeline: 36-48 months to full optimization

Impact Analysis: Who Gets Hurt by S4154

Communities Already Harmed by War on Drugs

Demographic reality: Cannabis prohibition enforcement disproportionately targeted people of color.

New Jersey prohibition enforcement data (pre-legalization):

• Black New Jerseyans: 3× more likely to be arrested for cannabis despite similar usage rates
• Latino New Jerseyans: 2× more likely to be arrested
• Urban communities: Concentrated enforcement creating criminal records

S4154 would recreate this pattern:

Who cannot afford 50% legal price premium?

• Low-income households
• Communities with lower median incomes
• Same communities targeted by War on Drugs

Who gets prosecuted for "knowingly purchasing from unlicensed source"?

• People in communities with established illicit networks
• Residents of urban areas where enforcement is concentrated
• Same communities targeted by War on Drugs

Result: S4154 resurrects War on Drugs enforcement patterns under guise of "protecting legal market"

Medical Patients

New Jersey medical cannabis program:

• 54,924 patients (down 50% from 125K+ peak)
• Products tax-exempt but still expensive
• Many patients cannot afford dispensary prices

Medical patient testimony (Senate Judiciary Committee, May 29):

Michael Brennan: "Could arrest people with cancer for accessing medicine they can afford"

Coalition for Medical Marijuana: Bill represents "opposite of what legalization set out to achieve"

Framework insight: Medical patients on fixed incomes (disability, Social Security) face same price competitiveness failure as adult-use consumers. S4154 would criminalize medical patients for economic necessity.

Municipal Opt-Out Communities

63% of New Jersey municipalities (357 of 564) ban cannabis sales

Residents in these communities:

• No legal access within their municipality
• Must travel to neighboring towns (if those allow sales)
• Or purchase from illicit sources (unlicensed delivery, traditional dealers)

S4154 creates absurd situation:

• Municipality bans legal dispensaries
• Residents have no legal local access
• Residents purchase from available (illicit) sources
• State prosecutes residents for not having legal local option

This is government creating the problem it prosecutes people for.

Social Equity Business Owners

Social equity businesses disproportionately serve price-conscious communities

Current performance:

• +56.8% YoY growth
• Locations in underserved areas
• Customer base: Lower-income demographics

S4154 impact:

• Criminalizes the customer base social equity businesses serve
• Creates fear/stigma around cannabis purchases in communities social equity program targets
• Undermines entire social equity framework

The cruel irony: Legalization created social equity program to repair War on Drugs harms. S4154 resurrects War on Drugs tactics against same communities.

Framework Recommendations

Based on validated CBDT analysis across 24 markets, New Jersey should:

1. REJECT S4154

Immediate action: Senate Judiciary Committee should decline to advance bill

Rationale:

• Would worsen legal market performance (42-48% vs. current 48-55%)
• Unprecedented criminalization of consumer purchase source
• Diverts enforcement resources from effective supplier targeting
• Recreates War on Drugs enforcement patterns
• Fundamentally misunderstands how cannabis markets work

2. Implement Supplier-Focused Enforcement

Budget: $10-15M annually (dedicated cannabis enforcement unit)

Personnel: 20-30 agents (State Police + AG's Office coordination)

Targets:

• Large-scale illegal cultivation warehouses
• Unlicensed storefronts
• Interstate trafficking networks
• NOT consumers

Metrics:

• Illegal cultivation operations shut down
• Pounds of illegal cannabis seized
• Unlicensed retail locations closed
• Disruption of organized illegal supply chains

3. Fix Price Competitiveness FIRST

Policy:

• Maintain SEEF at $2.50/oz (reject 500% increase)
• Accelerate cultivation licensing
• Allow outdoor/greenhouse cultivation
• Supply expansion funding

Goal: Retail prices of $180-220/oz (competitive with illicit $180-250/oz)

Framework principle: Enforcement effectiveness multiplied by price competitiveness. Fix prices FIRST, then enforcement works.

4. Address Access Gaps

Municipal opt-out reduction:

• Revenue-sharing program
• $15M annual investment
• Reduce 63% opt-out to 40%

Result: Fewer cannabis deserts, less incentive for illicit purchases

5. Consumer Education (Not Criminalization)

Messaging:

• Safety benefits of tested products
• Quality consistency
• Product variety and convenience
• Supporting legal jobs and tax revenue

NOT:

• Threats of prosecution
• Stigmatization
• War on Drugs rhetoric

6. Focus on Organized Crime, Not Individual Consumers

Recognition: Large-scale illegal operations are actual threat, not individual consumers

Resource allocation:

• Intelligence gathering on major operators
• Multi-agency coordination
• Asset forfeiture from large operations
• NOT court costs prosecuting individual purchases

7. Monitor and Adapt

Data tracking:

• Legal market share trends
• Illicit market indicators
• Enforcement effectiveness metrics
• Price competitiveness monitoring

Adaptive policy: Adjust enforcement strategy based on data, not political frustration

Conclusion: Enforcement Complements Price Competitiveness, Cannot Replace It

Senate President Scutari's S4154 represents a fundamental misunderstanding of cannabis market dynamics and enforcement effectiveness.

The Consumer-Driven Black Market Displacement Framework, validated across 24 U.S. states with 5% mean absolute error, demonstrates unambiguously that enforcement complements price competitiveness but cannot replace it.

When legal cannabis costs 40-60% more than illicit alternatives—New Jersey's current reality—consumer behavior is driven by economic necessity, not law. S4154's attempt to criminalize economically rational behavior would:

Worsen legal market performance: 42-48% legal share (down from current 48-55%)

Waste enforcement resources: Prosecuting consumers instead of disrupting supply

Recreate War on Drugs harms: Disproportionate impact on communities already targeted by prohibition

Undermine social equity: Criminalize the customer base social equity businesses serve

Fail to reduce illicit market: Demand driven by price, not law

The framework demonstrates what works: competitive legal prices combined with supplier-focused enforcement.

Michigan's model:

• Legal prices: $83/oz average
• Enforcement: 50+ agents, $10M+ budget, supplier-focused
• Result: 85% legal market share

New Jersey under S4154:

• Legal prices: $300-350/oz (360% higher than Michigan)
• Enforcement: Consumer criminalization, weak supplier targeting
• Predicted result: 35-45% legal market share (worse than Illinois disaster)

New Jersey with evidence-based approach:

• Legal prices: $180-220/oz (supply expansion, SEEF maintained)
• Enforcement: $10-15M budget, 20-30 agents, supplier-focused
• Predicted result: 75-82% legal market share (Massachusetts-level success)

The choice is clear: learn from Michigan's success or repeat the mistakes of alcohol Prohibition.

S4154 should be rejected. Instead, New Jersey should:

1. Fix price competitiveness through supply expansion
2. Implement supplier-focused enforcement with adequate resources
3. Reduce municipal opt-outs to improve access
4. Support consumers through education, not criminalization

The framework shows the way. The question is whether New Jersey policymakers will follow evidence or political expediency.

Cannabis advocates are right: S4154 represents "the opposite of what legalization set out to achieve."

Attorney General Platkin may face criticism for "absentee leadership," but the solution isn't prosecuting consumers—it's giving enforcement resources to target actual threats while fixing the price competitiveness failure that makes illicit markets viable.

Until New Jersey addresses the $300-350/oz legal vs. $180-250/oz illicit price gap, no amount of enforcement—consumer-focused or otherwise—will achieve legal market dominance.

Revenue optimization, public safety, and social equity all require the same thing: competitive legal prices that give consumers economic incentive to choose legal sources.

Then, and only then, does enforcement against illegal suppliers become maximally effective.

For comprehensive analysis of New Jersey's cannabis market and policy recommendations, see our New Jersey Cannabis Market Analysis.

To track this bill and other New Jersey cannabis legislation, visit our Cannabis Bill Tracker.